

**RAISING THE AWARENESS OF HALAL PRODUCTS
AMONG INDONESIAN CONSUMERS: ISSUES AND
STRATEGIES**

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Abstract

The bargaining power of consumers is a significant factor that determines the structure of industry competition. Due to the fact that the majority of Indonesians are Muslim, issues on non halal products have significant impact on processed food business. In regards to this increased awareness in the community, there are some problems related to processed food businesses, which are consumers' perceptions, producers' concerns, limited number of accreditation institution office, and costly procedures of halal certification. Analysis of this issues used Soft System Methodology (SSM), where the transformation processes expected was set up, scenarios were built and strategies in raising halal awareness were developed based on scenarios. The conclusion is that the government should be able to evaluate the impact and immediacy of the issues, and developing appropriate strategies to establish a favorable business environment as well as satisfy community's needs. The successful of this strategy definitely is unable to get by without the government's seriousness in performing its function as public servant and government' political will to protect the community from public deception actions.

Keywords: *halal, awareness, consumers, processed, business.*

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I. INTRODUCTION

Halal awareness among Indonesian Muslims can be proved by their responses towards issues related to the unlawfulness of some processed food. In 1989, when there was an issue about swine oil mixed in processed food, many people avoided consuming processed food altogether. As a result, some processed food businesses almost collapsed. Another issue occurred in 2001, when a well known flavor producer was found to be using a swine enzyme in its production process, even though it had obtained a *halal* certificate and used halal labelling on their product. Consequently, consumers abandoned the company's products causing the company to suffer from A\$ 4.9 million in financial losses.

This significant impact on the processed food industry is logical due to the fact that the majority of Indonesians are Muslim. One of Islam's specific teachings is related to food, where some kinds of meat products and other material is considered *haram* (forbidden) not to be consumed by Muslims. Thus, various businesses directly or indirectly involved in the food-related industries, such as producers, the government, as well as accreditation institutions should pay attention to this issue. This is extremely important for the food industry, since the bargaining power of consumers, as suggested by Porter (1980), is a significant factor that determines the structure of industry competition, expected margins, combined with other factors such as the bargaining power of suppliers, new entrants, substitution products and existing competitors.

Demographic data shows that over the period 1990-2002, the Indonesian population grew from 179 million in 1990 to 212,300, million in 2002; an increase of 18.44% over the period. This trend was matched with the growth of the Muslim composition in Indonesia for the same period. In 1990, the Muslim population in Indonesia was approximately 87.5%, which increased to 88.2% in 2002. Similarly, the food industry in Indonesia was undergoing a growth trend at this time. A survey conducted by Euromonitor revealed that over the period 1998-2003 the processed food sector in Indonesia grew by an average of 3.195% per year.

Moreover, along the lines of population growth and the increase in the number of food production businesses, religious awareness amongst Indonesian Muslims also increased. The increase in religious observance is known to lead to a deeper understanding about Islam in the community, which includes their understanding about food as one aspect of Islamic teachings. In regards to this increased awareness in the community, there are some problems that have arisen in the society related to processed food businesses.

The first problem is related to consumers' perceptions. Since Muslims are a majority in Indonesia, consumers naturally assume that all products sold are halal. In fact, most of the largest processed food producers in Indonesia are not Muslim-owned and essentially do not understand about *halal* rules. The other problem is that processed foods currently employ complicated technologies and additives that are possibly generated from *haram* materials. It is not easy to trace back the process without applying appropriate technological means.

The second problem in regards to awareness of halal issues concerns the producers' themselves. Corresponding to the consumers' assumptions and that the *halal* accreditation is not compulsory, there are numerous food producers who produce *halal* products who not displaying the *halal* label on their products. From a business point of view, this attitude will reduce the company's competitiveness. The common perception is that the *halal* accreditation procedure is complicated and costly. On the other hand, there are some producers who do not have appropriate knowledge about *halal* food and assume that their product is *halal*, and therefore display the *halal* label on their products without a *halal* certificate and license from The Assessment Institute of Foods, Drugs and Cosmetics of The Indonesian Council of *Ulama* (AIFDC-ICU) or LPPOM MUI for local acronym and The Ministry of Health. This action can be categorized as public deception.

The third problem is the limitation of the AIFDC-ICU as a trusted accreditation institution. Currently, there are only 7 offices of AIFDC-ICU across Indonesia, a country which has 32 provinces. Consequently, producers from regions that are far away from the AIFDC-ICU

offices face difficulties when applying for *halal* accreditation. The fourth problem in *halal* awareness relates to the procedure of *halal* accreditation being inefficient and costly. As explained previously, applicants must pass through two ‘doors’ to obtain the right to display *halal* labelling; firstly the AIFDC-ICU and then to The Ministry of Health.

II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The framework used to analyse this issue is known as the Soft System Methodology (SSM). According to Bulow as cited in Checkland and Scholes (1990) the aim of SSM is to incite greater change in the area of social matters by triggering “a learning cycle” amongst people. The SSM can be represented as a seven-stage process (Checkland 1975 as cited in Checkland & Scholes 1990), where the SSM is used as an enquiry tool to interface with a system.

Given the situation explained in the introduction above, the root definition can be defined as follows: “The Ministry of Health regulates and manages systems to provide more *halal* products to the community by providing a reasonable and affordable *halal* certification procedure in order to fulfil the community’s satisfaction in the religious aspect of the food’s quality”. Based upon the root definition above, the transformation processes expected are:

• Limited <i>halal</i> certified products	→	Numerous <i>halal</i> certified products
• Limited /centralized <i>halal</i> accreditation institutions	→	More decentralized <i>halal</i> accreditation institutions
• Less coordinated accreditation system	→	More coordinated accreditation system
• Informal coordination with other related institutions such as Ministry of Health and Ministry of Industry and Trade	→	Formal coordination with other related institutions such as the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Industry and Trade
• Costly process of analysis especially for small scale food producers	→	Affordable analysis system to cater for small scale food producers

Furthermore, C-A-T-W-O-E of the issue can be defined as the following: 1) C (Customers) are muslim communities in Indonesia, who, as consumers, will be satisfied in relation to religious observance; however, they may also suffer due to the possibility of higher prices for the products and processed food producers who obtain benefits through formal recognition leading to higher sales; however they may also have to bear the financial cost of the additional procedure implemented in their production process, 2) A (Actor) is The Minister of Health, 3) T (Transformation) is from anxious consumers to satisfied consumers, 4) W (Weltanschauung) is consumer satisfaction through religious observance can be fulfilled by providing *halal* food through an appropriately *halal* certified system, 5) O (Owners) are the *halal* accreditation institution, the government (the Ministry of Health), and processed food producers, and 6) E (Environment) is system and regulations that enable all *halal* processed food producers to obtain the formal *halal* certificate and accreditation.

In investigating this issue, a definition of what is *halal* in the Islamic perspective is first required. Furthermore, a description of the current situation and investigation into contemporary problems will be presented.

III. DISCUSSIONS

3.1. Definition of Halal Food

Islam is a religion based on high moral principles. An important part of being considered a good Muslim is commitment and devotion to these principles. One of the principles is related to food and beverage consumption, where in Islam, in addition to association with basic physical needs, food consumption has links to spiritual wellbeing in the form of faith and worship. Islamic teaching considers that food consumed by a person will affect his/her attitudes, therefore food for consumption must meet at least two basic conditions: food must be acceptable both religiously and lawfully (*halal*) and

food must be healthy. It is mentioned in the holy Qur'an (Al-Qur'an 7: 31).

In Islam, there is a basic legal norm that human attitudes relate to the individual's relationship with the Creator (God/Allah). Additionally, this norm extends to human activities and interactions with other creatures (i.e. amongst humans, animals, plants, etc). The basic legal norm of the relationship with the Creator is that any kind of worship to God is prohibited unless there is clear guidance and shown by the prophet Muhammad. Conversely, legal norms related to human activities and interaction with other creatures is permitted unless there is a clear prohibition. Food and beverage consumption are included in the second term. The basic premise of this belief is that any kind of food is lawful (*halal*), unless there is a clear prohibition against its consumption.

The prohibited foods are stated in the Holy Al-Qur'an (Al-Qur'an 5:3), and given the abovementioned verses, the Muslim scholars (*ulama'*) conclude that *halal* food shall: 1) Contain no swine whether in form of fresh meat or its generated products, no carrion of any animals (except fish and locust, since they can't be slaughtered), no intoxicants, no blood in liquid or in other forms, no other prohibited animals mentioned in the holy Al-Qur'an, 2) Contain no lawful animals and their generated products which have been slaughtered in the non-Islamic way (e.g. boiled alive, strangled, or killed by other animals) since it is categorized as carrion, and 3) Be stored and cooked separately and using different cooking utensils from non-halal food, or the utensils used for non-halal food must be washed in the Islamic way before being used to process halal materials.

3.2. Evidences of Halal Awareness

Alongside the fact that most Indonesians are Muslim and that the increase in the packaged food business in Indonesia is supported by statistical data, there is another equally important fact that cannot be quantified. Agribusiness participants must be aware that rising awareness about Islamic values is an important issue for business success in Indonesia. The statistical data alone does not reflect this particular issue; however there is some historical evidence to support this claim.

In 1989, there was an issue about swine oil mixed in some processed food products. The case was resolved when a lecturer of food technology at Brawijaya University, Tri Soesanto, conducted research with some of his students after seeing his Muslim friend eat bacon not realising that bacon is a pork product. Soesanto found that there were 34 packaged products sold in Indonesian supermarkets and traditional markets which contained intoxicants as well as gelatine, shortening and lard generated from swine (Zuri, Hanibal & Yusi 1996). The findings were published in *Canopy*, a University bulletin, and were then discussed at a seminar held by a Muslim scholar group.

The greatest negative effect of the research occurred when the 34 products identified were accidentally added to by an irresponsible person who changed it to 64 products. The issue led to decrease in sales of not only the suspected products mixed with swine oil, but also other well known packaged food products such as Dancow (milk), Indomie (instant noodle), and Bango (soybean ketchup). Consequently, some retailers and processed food producers were almost bankrupted (Pikiran Rakyat 1997; Widajanti 2003).

In 2001, a well-known MSG brand, Ajinomoto, was discovered to be using swine fat in its production process. In actual fact, the product had already attained a *halal certificate* in 1999. However, in mid-2000 the producer replaced one supporting essence without discussing the change with the authorized accreditation institution. As a result, after the producer used the new essence in the manufacturing process, it was found that the product was not halal. In this case Ajinomoto had performed two misconducts. Firstly, the company had broken the rules relating to public deception; and secondly the company had disparaged consumer trust in the product by disrespecting religious beliefs of the Muslims. Once the information was spread, consumers abandoned the product, and the government order withdrawal of all of the company's products from the market (Widajanti 2003).

3.3. Raising Halal Awareness

Regarding *halal* awareness, it is widely known that previously most Muslim consumers in Indonesia already have intrinsic knowledge and understanding about *halal* food; however, they have not recognized yet that not all processed foods sold are indeed *halal*. Many consumers assumed that because most Indonesians are Muslim, all products sold should be *halal*, whereas, not all processed food producers are Muslim. Additionally, the identification of processing and raw materials used in the food industry was traditionally uncomplicated. The origins of this increased awareness really began progressing in 1989 when the swine oil issue was brought to public attention as explained previously. The case awakened Indonesian society from a long sleep. The Ajinomoto case in 2001, additionally, made Indonesian society realize that obtaining *halal* food products is not as easy as they thought, since food products come from a high-tech and complicated food engineering process.

When processing of a food product uses a simple method and contains obvious raw materials, it is not difficult to distinguish between *halal* and non-*halal* food. However, since the development of food science, which has also had the effect of altering peoples' preferences towards increased flavour and quality, the difficulty in delivering *halal* products to meet market demand is greater than previously experienced. Food processing may apply complicated methods and use generated products as additive essences, possibly generated from non-*halal* material such as gelatine, emulsifier, shortening, lard, et cetera, requiring intensified specification to indicate the content of original materials.

Muslim customers are more relying more and more on The Indonesian Council of *Ulama* (ICU), or MUI, the local acronym-which is an independent institution providing assistance, guidance and advice in religious matters, to assess the *halal* status of a product rather than other institutions. In response to the technological developments in food processing, which have necessitated the need for a deeper and more complex analysis into a product's *halal/haram* status, the ICU

established an assessment agency known as the AIFDC-ICU on January 6, 1989 (LP POM MUI 2003). The agency was established to assist MUI in promulgating policies, rules, recommendations and counselling concerning Islamic food, drugs and cosmetics preparation in an Islamic perspective. In other words, AIFDC-ICU was established to fulfill the Muslim customers' satisfaction in religious observance.

In the earlier years of its establishment, the AIFDC - ICU concentrated on seminars and discussions in collaboration with some experts and Islamic scholars to create a solid groundwork for customer protection and food safety; the utilization of biotechnology products supporting foods, drugs and cosmetics production; intoxicants and essences in beverage products, certification and halal food labelling (LP POM MUI, 2003).

The AIFDC-ICU began to issue Halal Certificates in 1994 for some industries that had passed the audit process. In 1995, this organization had gained sufficient trust to examine products of foreign companies such as cheese and dairy products from New Zealand, Nippi Casing from Japan, Health Foods from the USA and Energy Drinks from Thailand. All information concerning *halal* certified products was then published in a bimonthly magazine called the "Halal Journal", which has been in production since 1994 (LP POM MUI 2003). To obtain the *halal* certificate, a producer must adhere to the following steps (Pesantren.net 2001):

1. The applicants must firstly fill out the available application form. The form must be attached with other supporting documents such as evidence of quality systems including a quality standard procedure, statement of readiness for on site audits, samples of the product, raw and supporting materials, as well as all additives.
2. Original documents must be shown, and copies must be submitted to the AIFDC - ICU for analysis.
3. The AIFDC - ICU then checks all the documentation. If the documents are complete, the AIFDC-ICU analyses the sample and undertakes an on-site audit. Otherwise, the documents are returned to the applicant to be completed.

4. The result of the analysis and on-site audit then are evaluated by the *Fatwa Commission* of the ICU. If the evaluation produces a “religiously feasible” conclusion, the *Halal Certificate* then is issued. Otherwise, the AIFDCICU will offer some suggestions to replace the non-halal materials and essences with other materials regarded as halal.
5. The initial Halal Certificate is valid for a period of two years, and if during the period the producer changes raw and supporting materials or additive essences, it should be reported to the AIFDC-ICU, unless the materials receive a valid Halal Certificate.
6. One month prior to the expiry date, the producer is required to renew the certificate for the next year. Otherwise, the producer is not allowed to use *halal* labelling on their products, and this will be announced by the AIFDCICU.
7. Based on the *halal* certificate, the producer applies for *halal* labelling on its products to The Ministry of Health

3.4. Existing Problems and Its Driving Forces

To date, the *halal* certification is not required for all processed food, since not all Indonesians are Muslim. However, there are a lot of food producers that produce *halal* products who are not putting the *halal* label on their products, while the consumers’ awareness towards the *halal* label is rising. On the other hand, there are some producers who implement a simple process and use clearly halal raw materials, who put the *halal* label on their products without legal accreditation from the authorized and trusted agency such as AIFDC-ICU.

If this situation is allowed, the consequences that possibly arise are: first, the processed food producers that do not put the *halal* label will be left by their consumers, since the consumers will consider their products as non-halal or doubtful; second, those who put the *halal* label on illegally – although their products are *halal* - will possibly be followed by other irresponsible producers who put the *halal* label on in cases where their products actually are not *halal*/ leading to public deception.

The other problem related to *halal* certification is that – in contradiction to consumers’

awareness – the number of *halal* certificates issued by AIFDCICU is still low. In 1994, when the AIFDC-ICU started to issue Halal Certificates, there were about 192 halal certificates for various products awarded to companies throughout Indonesia. Now, based on report on Indohalal.com 2003, totally there are more than 2,800 halal certificate issued by AIFDC-ICU. Compared to hundreds of thousands of packaged food producers in Indonesia, the number is not so noteworthy.

Regarding these problems, there are some factors that can be regarded as the driving force. First, AIFDC-ICU as an accreditation institution trusted by consumers to perform tests and issue *halal* certificates, is not widespread across Indonesia. Indonesia currently has 60 experts in food science, chemistry and other related sciences at Bogor Agricultural University (formerly known as IPB) who work for AIFDC-ICU and deeply examine products before issuing halal certificates (Yus 2004). This expertise is internationally recognized as explained above, where some countries such as New Zealand, Japan, USA and Thailand have asked AIFDC-ICU to examine the *halalness* of their products.

Nevertheless, equipment and laboratories for assessing the *halalness* of a product are also still limited and concentrated in Java, while there are a lot of food producers located out of Java. When the swine oil issue emerged in 1989, The Ministry of Health joined with AIFDC-ICU, but they faced difficulties in conducting evaluations in cities out of Java, since the chromatography equipment used to test the swine content was only available in Jakarta (Zuri, Hanibal & Yusi 1996). Indonesia has 33 provinces but has only six regional AIFDC-ICUs. Consequently, it will take time and money to apply such certification, especially for small regional producers. Actually there are a lot of producers that want get the *halal* certificate, and now there are about 900 thousand products and food producers who want to get the certificate.

Second, the procedure of *halal* application is not efficient. The producers must apply to “two different doors for the serial process” in order to be able to put *halal* label on their products; firstly, apply to AIFDC-ICU to get *halal* certificate, and then apply to The Ministry of Health for

halal labelling. This procedure is potentially causing a “clash” between the producers, AIFDCICU as independent agency trusted by consumers as well as by producers, and The Ministry of Health as the government’s agency. Companies that already got a *halal* certificate from AIFDC-ICU feel that they have right to put *halal* labelling on their products without conformity to any other institution (Zuhri, Hanibal, and Yusi 1996)

Third, a Rp. 100,000 up to Rp. 1 million fee to get a *halal* certificate of two years validity is too expensive, especially for small scale food producers that produce local food products. The fee is inevitable since there are expenses in analysing a *halal* food, such as testing materials and equipment as well as transportation costs because the AIFDC-ICU is not a subsidized government agency.

Fourth, there is low coordination between institutions related to *halal* certification (for example, between AIFDC-ICU Central with the existing regional AIFDC-ICU about systems and authorization of *halal* certification; between AIFDC-ICU, The Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Finance and The Ministry of Justice and Human Rights about *halal* labelling, fee and tax, legal actions).

The fifth, the *halalness* test is performed by AIFDCU-ICU only before the products are produced. There is no market verification that tests products at sale in the market. Market verification is only performed if there is a report from consumers about suspected products.

At the end, there is not yet a global standard for *halal* analysis technique. Products with a *halal* certificate from one country that do not meet the standard required are sometimes rejected by another. There was a *halal* certificate issued by an accreditation institution from a developed country, which was not acknowledged by Indonesia since the qualification did not meet the standard criteria and it was found that the country did misconduct. In 2000, Indonesia rejected three tonnes of chicken’ legs imported from the USA (Harian Neraca 2002; Kompas 2003). Although the product was stated as *halal* by the exporter, the AIFDC-ICU still doubted its process, and finally, the quarantine agency destroyed all the imported chicken legs (Kompas 2003).

3.5. Scenario Building and Strategy Options

The increase of religious observance in Indonesian Muslim community that leads to the increase of awareness on food quality especially *halal* requirement is one of the changes, and should be anticipated by the government wisely. The government - in this case, The Ministry of Health - should provide efficient system and policies that that leads to a comprehensive solution for all parties involved in food business, i.e.: the producers that run business activities, AIFDC-ICU as a trusted independent agency, and the consumers as the beneficiary of a well organized system.

In other words, it is necessary to the Government to implement appropriate strategies and policies required to transform the condition, from an anxious community as a result of less coordinated *halal* accreditation system, to coordinated *halal* accreditation system that leads to consumers satisfied about the religious aspect of the food's quality. Otherwise, it will emerge a volatile circumstance. Therefore, in developing strategic plans that are able to overcome the current problems anticipatively, the Government need to successfully negotiate the future by establishing appropriate scenario planning that consist of the possible situations of the world in the future.

Scenario planning is a practice for managing through uncertainty, a sophisticated strategic planning practice, and employed by many successful organizations and enterprises (KLM Inc. 2003a). Moreover, according to Ringland (1998) scenario planning is "part of strategic planning which relates to the tools and technology for managing the uncertainties for the future". Originally, scenario planning referred to the systematic examination of a range of ways or "scenarios" wherein situations could develop. It is aimed at encouraging more perceptive decision-making and planning for the long-range future (KLM Inc. 2003a).

As suggested by Peters (1996), successful scenarios must have three characteristics: inclusive, universal and poignant. Inclusion means that all those are involved in the decision must feel included. Universal represents a wide research for forces of change and respect all views regardless disagreement. The richer information and material obtained from different point of view, the scenario set up will be more representative.

Moreover, there are two important understandings about long-term planning: the first, it is possible that there will be many different futures at any particular time, depend on how many elements work out in any certain situation (KLM Inc. 2003a); the second, generally, planning is about our wish in the future and it is achieved with insufficient regard to the situation complexities (KLM Inc. 2003a). Scenario planning includes the development of picture of the future, that involves the best and worst-case, or likely and unlikely options (KLM Inc. 2003a), and are constructed based on some trends (Ringland 1998).

The global changes cyclically are influenced by four major aspects: politic, economic, social and technology that influence each other. Currently global situation is more influenced by political and economical aspects driven by conflict of interest trend, in regards to the trend of the conflict of interest, as presented in Figure 1.

Scenario 1 is an optimistic view about the future, where clashes amongst different element of societies, cultures and other conflict of interests are able to be well managed by political leaders. Such a condition will stimulate the emergence of economic growth marked by a number of new investment and business activities that lead to increase community's welfare. The higher income then will push the higher number of high educated people.

In Scenario 2, contrary to Scenario 1, an unstable politic environment emerges as the result of never ending clashes and conflicts. Consequently, investment and economic activities are stagnant, or even there are a lot of collapsed business entities including processed food business. This condition can diminish community's welfare and increase poverty that lead to low level of education quality. Finally, there is less choice of food in the market




Figure 1. Scenarios of the Future Driven by Conflict of Interest

In deciding strategies to anticipate possible future as described in the two scenarios, the government should consider that whatever the future might look like, its position is as public servant. Therefore, whatever the scenarios in the future, the strategies developed should be focused on how to serve public in effectively and efficiently. It is important to note that the existence of AIFDC-ICU as an independent body emerged from community's aspiration is inevitable and it is irreplaceable even by the Department of Religion. For that reason and regarding the sensitiveness of this issue, the government should consider the role of AIFDC-ICU in developing strategies. Moreover, in developing strategies, it is assumed that consumer's awareness towards *halal* food will not decrease. By taking into account internal abilities such as human resources and financial support, applicable possible strategies based upon the scenarios are as described in Figure 2.

In Strategy 1, the favourable environment will enable the Government to allocated fund to support AIFDC-ICU in providing service to the community. The Government could improve coordination with AIFDC-ICU so that the producers who want to apply for *halal* certificate and *halal* label will only need to pass one door in a shorter time. The support for AIFDC-ICU also can be performed by providing subsidized training and courses related to AIFDCICU activities. Regarding the spread of food producers across Indonesia, to rise the accessibility of AIFDC-ICU, the Ministry of Health can also assist AIFDC-ICU by establish representatives at least one office for each province. In addition, to stimulate the small and medium processed food enterprises (SMEs) in obtaining *halal* certificate, the Ministry implements a cut-cost scheme by discharging them from processing fees. To be eligible for this scheme they must meet conditions applied. Given that high accessibility and efficient procedure, the Government, on the other hand, should apply law enforcement for those who are doing public deceptions.




Figure 2. Strategies Developed Based on Scenarios

In Strategy 2, since the Government is busied by starvation and poverty, therefore the focused of activities are on the food aid programs. Nevertheless, it does not mean that Strategy 1 is not applied. There are still some policies to implement Strategy 1, but it is not as aggressive as in Scenario 1. In conditions under Scenario 2, the government may apply selective food aid programs by only providing staple food such as corn, rice, noodle, and non-red meat food such as egg and fish. In fact, under Scenario 2, the *halal* awareness can be satisfied, since the meat products or processed food will be more expensive and unaffordable. Hence, providing more alternative cheap and *halal* food such as egg, fish and vegetables can be performed without any significant difficulties.

It is important to note that in regards to the role of the Ministry of Health as facilitator, regulator and public servant; certainly it has different goals from profit oriented business entities. Occasionally, strategies developed by non-profit organizations often “non-existent, partial or weak” compared to strategy of profit organization (KLM Inc. 2003b). In addition, in the short term, the results achieved are unmeasurable quantitatively. Thus, in formulating strategies, setting up success indicators for each strategy, and abilities to benchmark and improve performance that allow public to check how far the public services performed by the government have achieved desired outcomes is necessary. Under the scenarios established and strategies developed, success indicators that can be determined to review them are presented in Figure 3.

Success Indicator
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The matching between number <i>halal</i> labelled product types and number of certificate issued.• The increase of <i>halal</i> certification application regionally, especially by SMEs that reflects affordable system and procedure.• The reduction of time service that reflects efficiency.• Less complaint about non-<i>halal</i> products.

Figure 3. Success Indicators of Strategies Developed

IV. CONCLUSION

As an opened-economy country that cannot avoid the influence of global issues and changes, Indonesia should have ability to review and evaluate the issues. The government should be able to evaluate the impact and immediacy of the issues, and developing appropriate strategies to establish a favorable business environment as well as satisfy community's needs. Scenarios building and strategy options presented in this research hopefully will be able to overcome emerged problems related to the raising of public awareness towards *halal* quality food. The successful of this strategy, definitely is unable to get by without the government's seriousness in performing its function as public servant and how far the government' political will to protect the community from public deception actions and insecurity. This research hopefully will assist the Ministry of Health in achieving its objectives as a credible public servant.

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